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Transplanting Emissions Trading to
Interstate Areas: Will It Take Root?
I. Introduction
Congress continued its war on air pollution with the pas-
sage of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (the Act).1 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was charged with
strict orders to reduce air pollution. A rigid command and
control statutory framework coupled with citizen suit provi-
sions assured that EPA would carry out the work left undone
by the states and industry.' Almost immediately EPA had
trouble carrying out its mandate. Politically objective, tech-
nology-based control standards proved difficult to develop;
EPA would be sued by environmentalists if standards ap-
peared too weak and by industry if they appeared too tough.
As the deadlines of the 1970 Act passed, some areas faced
complete moratoriums on construction of new plants. A severe
recession caused by the Arab oil embargo placed pressure on
Congress and EPA to relax the Act. In order to avoid the di-
rect sacrifice of environmental goals for economic necessity,
EPA proposed allowing new sources in non-attainment areas
provided that emission increases from new plants were offset
by emission decreases at existing sources.3 Through the force
of political pressure, the offset policy sprung up through the
rigid structure of the Act. Emissions trading has now become
an important element of air pollution regulation in the 1980's.
At the same time air pollution regulation was modified to
include emissions trading, the effects of acid rain became the
focus of increasing scientific and political concern. In the early
1970's, evidence began to gather from throughout the world of
1. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-12, 7471-73, 7501-03, 7604 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. See infra note 27.
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the possible effects of acid rain on the forests and lakes."
A broader term, "acid deposition," has come to describe
instances when any acidic pollution falls back to earth. Com-
bustion of fuel initiates the environmental chain reaction
which creates acid deposition. Sulfur in the fuel reacts with
oxygen in the air to form sulfur dioxide (SO2). The high tem-
peratures of combustion fuse nitrogen and oxygen into nitro-
gen oxides (NO.. Once in the air, SO 2 and NO1 gradually react
with oxygen and sunlight to form sulfate and nitrate particles.
"Wet deposition" results when the sulfates and nitrates com-
bine with moisture in the air to form acids. The acids then
become part of clouds, fog, mist, snow, hail and rain. Acid rain
can be ten to thirty times more acidic than normal rain. "Dry
deposition" occurs when gravity or wind cause the sulfates
and nitrates to settle directly out of the air. "In the moist cli-
mates of the eastern United States, wet and dry deposition
occur nearly in equal amounts. In the dry climates of the
West, the amount of dry deposition may be as much as fifteen
times that of wet deposition."6
As the scientific data has gathered on the effects of acid
deposition, the political debate over what to do about acid
deposition heated up. Studies estimated the cost of control-
ling acid deposition could be as much as four to five billion
dollars annually' incurred mostly by utility customers in the
Midwest. Costs would be especially high if wet-scrubbing were
mandated. A rift opened up in Congress between the Mid-
western states emitting the pollutants and the Northeastern
states receiving the deposition. Acid deposition reduction bills
proposed by politicians from the Northeast would be blocked
by politicians from the Midwest. How to distribute the enor-
mous costs of control remains a large stumbling block. One
bill proposed to distribute some of the costs of control
4. Postel, Air Pollution, Acid Rain and the Future of Forests: Part I, Am. For-
ests, July 1984, at 25.
5. Winslow, Acid Deposition: Back to Square One and Beyond, 11 Environs 1, 6,
U.C. Davis School of Law (1987).
6. Off. of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Rep. No. OTA-0-204, Acid Rain and
Transported Air Pollutants, Implications For Public Policy 169 (June 1985) [herein-
after OTA Report].
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through a nationwide utility tax.7 Many rejected that ap-
proach because the polluter would not have to pay for the pol-
lution control.'
Interstate emissions trading was proposed as a means to
reduce the cost of control in order to help alleviate the politi-
cal stalemate. Currently, Senate Bill 316 includes interstate
emissions trading provisions in order to increase state flexibil-
ity in controlling emissions and to encourage cost-effective
emission reduction techniques."
The promise and problems of interstate emissions trading
are unknown. However, the experience of current emissions
trading on the local level can serve as an example of the po-
tential for interstate trading. This article explores the poten-
tial promise and problems of interstate trading. Section II of
this article reviews the current system of local emissions trad-
ing. Section III looks to see whether the promises and
problems of local trading will be transplanted or magnified in
interstate trading. Section IV recommends environmental
standards and administrative mechanisms to enhance the
promise of emissions trading while minimizing the problems.
Concluding remarks are given in Section V.
II. Local Trading
A. Overview of EPA's Current Emissions Trading Policy
Emission trading involves the creation of surplus emis-
sion reductions at one source to provide a credit toward neces-
sary emission reductions at another source. 10 As a result, plant
managers have the flexibility to choose the most cost-effective
methods to reduce emissions.11 'States have the choice whether
or not to adopt emission trading programs.
The terms emission offset, netting, bubbles, banking and
generic trading rules describe specific parts of EPA's emission
trading program. Emission offsets permit construction of new
7. H.R. 4567, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
8. S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 849,855 (1987).
9. Id. §§ 185, 188.
10. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986)[hereinafter 1986 Policy].
11. Id. at 43,830.
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major sources in non-attainment areas if the new source
secures sufficient surplus emission reductions to offset new
emissions.12 Netting exempts modifications of existing sources
from new source review requirements so long as no significant
plant-wide emission increase occurs. 3 Bubbles allow existing
plants to meet emission reduction requirements on plant-wide
basis rather than unit-by-unit. Plants may increase emissions
from one unit in exchange for compensating surplus decreases
at others. 4 Plants can be imagined to be enclosed in a bubble
with a single emissions stack;' 5 plant managers seek to have
emissions from the imaginary bubble meet one plant-wide
emission standard rather than having to meet emission stan-
dards for each individual unit. Emissions Reduction Banking
allows states to establish banks in which firms may store
emission reduction credits for later use in offset, netting or
bubbling transactions. 6 Generic Trading Rules provide a
12. EPA promulgated its first offset policy in December 1976 (41 Fed. Reg.
55,525 (1976)) after pressure to amend the Clean Air Act to allow steel plants to
offset emissions from plant expansions. The courts struck down the initial policy but
Congress adopted the concept in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. For the evolu-
tion of the early offset policy see R. Liroff, Air Pollution Offsets (1980). The current
offset policy is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 (1986).
13. Offsetting emissions from modifications within a plant became known as
netting.
14. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,830. The 1986 Policy replaced EPA's origi-
nal bubble policy adopted in 1979 under the name of the Alternative Emissions Re-
duction Option (AERO policy). 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780 (1979). EPA defined a source not
as an individual emissions point but as an entire plant or plants. Id. at 71,786. EPA's
definition as applied to netting was upheld in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
source Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The AERO policy required SIP review and EPA approval for each bubble; conse-
quently, that review process took an average of eighteen months. Levin, Building a
Better Bubble at EPA, 9 Reg. 33, 38 (Mar./Apr. 1985). Modelling was required to
show SIP equivalence. EPA adoption of generic rules streamlined the bubble review
process assuring swifter approval. See infra note 17. However, the AERO policy still
did not allow existing sources in non-attainment areas to bubble.
15. Raufer & Feldman, Emissions Trading and What it May Mean for Acid
Deposition Control, Pub. Util. Fort., Aug. 16, 1984, at 19.
16. 1986 policy, supra note 10, at 43,831. EPA's first offset policy did not include
banking. EPA quickly realized that without banking, sources would operate high-pol-
luting facilities simply to preserve emission reductions for offsetting. Note, Emissions
Offset Banking, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 937, 943 (1980). Subsequently, EPA adopted
banking for offsets. 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280 (1979).
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streamlined mechanism for the approval of individual emis-
sion trades. In a way, EPA pre-approves trades meeting cer-
tain criteria set forth in EPA approved local rules thus avoid-
ing the need for case-by-case State Implementation Plan
(SIP) review and federal approval of each trade.1 7 EPA and
the public must still be provided an opportunity to comment
on emission trades under generic rules before they occur.18
Emission reduction credits (ERCs) are the common cur-
rency of emission trading activity. Only surplus, enforceable,
permanent and quantifiable reductions can qualify as ERCs.'9
Surplus emissions reductions are those reductions not re-
quired by current SIP regulations nor relied upon in SIPs to
meet other regulatory requirements. The lower of either the
actual or allowable emissions generally serves as the baseline
to calculate surplus emission reductions;"° the 1986 policy
adopted this method to deter "paper trades."" Any ERC
transaction must be approved by the state and be federally
enforceable;" enforceable compliance instruments are used to
mandate recordkeeping and assure the permanence of reduc-
tions. States are required to establish a reliable and consistent
method to calculate and quantify reductions."
17. 1986 policy, supra note 10, at 43,831. EPA eliminated the need for SIP re-
view under the AERO policy by allowing states to adopt generic rules. The first rules
EPA approved were New Jersey's in 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,551 (1981).
18. 1986 policy, supra note 10, at 43,853. Public comment on trades under ge-
neric rules was not required under previous policies.
19. Id. at 43,832.
20. Id. Sources may use allowable emissions if they demonstrate those values are
used in SIPs to demonstrate attainment or if they demonstrate by modelling that no
NAAQS (National Ambient Air Quality Standard) violation will occur. Id. Baseline
emissions for any source are the product of three factors: the emission rate per unit,
the plant production capacity, and the hours of operation. Id. For a description of
EPA's difficulties in determining emission baselines, see Levin, supra note 14, at 37.
21. The 1986 Policy clarified the method to calculate emission baselines. Under
the 1982 interim policy some sources used allowable emissions to calculate ERC base-
lines although their actual emissions were lower. Consequently, those sources could
then trade ERCs without decreasing actual emissions resulting in so called "paper
trades."
22. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,832. Means of making emission limits feder-
ally enforceable include SIP revisions, EPA approved generic rules and new source
preconstruction permits. Id.
23. Emissions Trading: Technical Issues Document. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,837 (1986)
1987]
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ERCs may be used in offset, netting and bubbling trans-
actions; however, ERCs from existing sources may not be used
to meet new source performance standards." Each trade must
involve the same pollutant.25 All trades must satisfy applica-
ble ambient air tests to assure maintenance or attainment of
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The
tests vary depending on the dispersion characteristics of the
pollutant; NO. and volatile organic compound (VOCs) trades
within an air basin can generally occur without detailed ambi-
ent modelling; SO 2, carbon monoxide (CO) and particulate
trades generally require ambient modelling; trades with signif-
icant ambient impacts require modelling of all nearby major
sources. In non-attainment, area trades must result in a
twenty percent excess reduction in order to show reasonable
further progress towards attainment.
Only emission reductions which qualify as ERCs can be
deposited in EPA-approved banks.26 States can accept and
evaluate requests to certify ERCs, maintain a public registry
of ERCs and track transfers and withdrawals from the bank.
State banking rules may establish ownership rights in ERCs
and may guarantee banked ERCs against full or partial reduc-
tion provided that the state uses other means to obtain any
emission reductions necessary to attain the NAAQS. Banking
of an ERC does not assure the owner of the ERC that use of
the ERC will not be limited by trading rules or other special
limitations. Banked emissions are treated as if they are "in
the air;" states cannot count banked ERCs toward emissions
reductions necessary to attain the NAAQS.
[hereinafter Technical Issues Document]. These methods include use of emission fac-
tors, stack tests, monitored values or process inputs. Id.
24. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,832-33.
25. Id. This could unnecessarily restrict acid deposition trading. Theoretically,
trades between NOx and S02 could occur on a two NOx for each S02 basis (S02 has
twice the acidification potential as NOx).
26. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,834-35.
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B. The Promise and Problems of Regional Trading
1. The Promise
Institution of emissions trading helped to mitigate the di-
rect clash of environmental values against economic goals.
Emissions trading softened the Act in order to allow economic
growth. The strict command and control regime of the Act
would have required plant closures and construction bans in
non-attainment areas without regard to the economic conse-
quences. 28 EPA would have committed political suicide if it
took such steps in the midst of an already severe recession.
Pressure from proposals such as the 1976 steel amendment
proposal prodded EPA to adopt offsets and bther emission
trading reforms.29
At the same time, EPA could not adopt a fine-tuning
strategy using variance procedures. During the late 1970's a
conservative, anti-government, anti-bureaucracy political shift
began to occur culminating in Ronald Reagan's election in
1980.0 Emissions trading was more in tune with that philoso-
phy than increased variance proceedings.
As a result of those constraints,"1 emissions trading was
27. Offsets could be considered a weakening of the Act since the 1970 Act pre-
vented new construction in non-attainment areas. See Clean Air Amendments of
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(4) (1982).
28. Meidinger, On Explaining the Development of Emissions Trading in U.S.
Air Pollution Regulation, 7 Law & Pol'y Q., 447, 456 (1985).
29. R. Liroff, Air Pollution Offsets: Trading, Selling, and Banking 6-7 (1980).
30. Meidinger, supra note 28, at 462.
31. Meidinger presents a further explanation of the development of emissions
trading. Administrators adopted emissions trading on their own initiative as well as
in reaction to political and economic pressures. Technology-based emission standards
proved impossible to determine by the scientifically objective standards envisioned in
the Act. Supposedly objective scientists and engineers presented information favoring
their own particular viewpoints which conflicted with those of other experts. Admin-
istrators began to realize that science could not objectively provide standards; they
had to choose between different points-of-view. Constantly choosing between conflict-
ing points of view increases the political pressures on administrators while diminish-
ing their political support. As a result, administrators seek a steady regulatory frame-
work which satisfies the opposing views as much as possible and minimizes the
opportunity for policy battles. Emissions trading provided that type of framework;
EPA could respond to the demands from industry for flexibility and cost-effective-
ness while calming environmentalists' fears that EPA or Congress would weaken the
7
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adopted. The most important principle of the emissions trad-
ing policy is that trades must not alter overall air quality re-
quirements. 2 Therefore, a well administered program should
achieve the goals of the Act as effectively as the command and
control approaches as well as allowing more economic solu-
tions to be found.
Emissions trading allows for more cost-effective pollution
control by giving more decision-making power to source oper-
ators. Without emissions trading, EPA or local agencies would
set uniform emission standards applying to a large number of
firms. Some firms, depending on the size and location, would
suffer disproportionate burdens; others would enjoy competi-
tive advantages.33 EPA could try to set precise plant-by-plant
standards; however, neither EPA nor local agencies could ever
know the pollution control opportunities within a plant as
well as the plant operators. 4 Furthermore, even if EPA tries
to get all the necessary information, plant managers would
have an incentive to inflate costs in order to avoid stricter
controls.3 A plant could gain a competitive edge if its compet-
itors had to use stricter controls. Therefore, under command
and control regulation, those with the responsibility have
Act. Also, emissions trading provided fewer opportunities for opponents to battle over
emission controls and helped diffuse debate when standards were set. Id. at 463-67.
32. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,814.
33. See Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Ad-
ministrative Regulation, 3 Wis. L. Rev. 655, 671 (1985); Pashigian, How Large and
Small Plants Fare Under Environmental Regulation, 7 Reg. 19 (Sept./Oct. 1983);
Miller, The Bubble-Concept A Feasible Emission Reduction Alternative?, 9 U. Day-
ton L. Rev. 65, 69-71 (1983).
In addition, while employed by the California Air Resources Board, the author,
Stephen Winslow, had noted that small refiners had considerably higher compliance
costs for leaded gasoline standards as compared to larger refiners because they had
less process flexibility and little excess cracking capacity. See Public Hearing to Con-
sider Amendments to Section 2253 and Adoption of Title 13, California Administra-
tive Code Regarding Lead in Gasoline, State of California Air Resources Board, Sta-
tionary Source Control Division (Sept. 1982).
34. Palmissano, Emissions Trading Reforms: Successes and Failures, 78th pro-
ceeding of the Air Pollution Control A., 85-45.1 at 4 (1985) [hereinafter Palmissano-
1985].
35. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy
15 (1985). A plant operator may risk fines for giving obviously false data. Favorable
but accurate data is much harder to detect.
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neither the information nor the economic incentive to set
cost-effective standards. On the other hand, those who must
provide the information and who must comply with the stan-
dards have an incentive to avoid cost-effective controls.
Enter emissions trading. Emissions trading puts the force
of the marketplace behind environmental goals. 6 EPA or lo-
cal officials set general emissions standards which provide the
baseline for trades. Plant operators must now meet those lim-
its as inexpensively as possible in order to stay competitive;
they may even buy rights from each other. Emissions trading
rewards companies using innovative control technology by giv-
ing them credit for surplus emission reductions.3 7 Under com-
mand and control regulations, EPA or local districts specify
the type of controls to be used. If a company installs more
effective controls it receives no credit. Technology-based stan-
dards discourage innovation and are even more problematic. A
company which installs an innovative control technology,
more effective than the current technology-based standard,
may later find that it has to install the innovation at all of its
plants. As a result, the company installs the standard controls
rather than take that chance.3 With emissions trading, com-
panies receive credit for surplus emissions reductions. They
can use the credits to cut costs elsewhere or sell them to other
firms.
Emissions trading deflects potential litigation over the
correct technological standard to apply.39 Under command
36. Lowering compliance costs also decreases the economic benefit of violating
the standards or delaying compliance through litigation. Levin, supra note 14, at 34-
35.
37. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Brokering Emissions Reduction Credits: A
Handbook, PB 81-214249 at 3 (1981).
38. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 23. While employed by the California
Air Resources Board, the author, Stephen Winslow, encountered a situation where a
source had installed a ten million dollar NOx reduction system which had been
proven effective in Japan. Monitoring equipment problems arose that prevented the
utility from operating the system as desired. The author's impression and those of the
other ARB engineers , was that the utility was not trying whole-heartedly to solve the
problem. See Jones, Review of United States NOx Abatement Technology, 78th pro-
ceedings of the Air Pollution Control Ass'n, 85-55.2 at 8 (1985).
39. Of course many lawsuits over the validity of the bubble under the Act would
not arise under Senate Bill 316. See supra note 14.
1987]
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and control regulation, a company excessively burdened by
specific control standards has no choice but to sue in order to
block its application. With more at stake in administrative
hearings, agencies become more cautious and spend more time
detailing the bases of their decisions. With emissions trading,
less focus falls on specific control technologies; companies
know they have the flexibility to meet the standards in other
ways. With less of their time spent developing specific stan-
dards or guarding against lawsuits, administrators can focus
more of their attention on auditing existing programs, enforc-
ing emission limits and achieving the overall goals of cleaner
air.'0
2. Environmental Concerns
Trading could result in the excessive transfer of pollu-
tants to a small area creating a "spatial hotspot" of locally
increased ambient pollutant concentrations. Spatial hotspots
could result at locations where the cost of trading for pollu-
tants was less than the cost of control. For instance, figure 1
shows three plants which burn coal. Plants A and B locate
near the coal deposit creating a spatial hotspot. If emission
standards were implemented and trading were allowed, plants
A and B could use the savings from their advantageous loca-
tion to purchase emission rights from plant C located away
from the spatial hotspot. Without some ambient constraint,
trading can thwart the goals of an air pollution program. Spa-
tial hotspot concerns are particularly important for pollutants
such as SO 2 and CO which tend to concentrate near the
source. For those pollutants, Tietenberg"1 suggests allowing
trading of ambient impacts rather than straight emissions
trades.
40. Levin, supra note 14, at 39. Other commentators worry that emissions trad-
ing increases administrative and enforcement burdens. See Latin, Ideal Versus Real
Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-tuning"
Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1270 (1985).
41. Tietenberg, supra note 35, at 24.
[Vol. 5
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Figure 1
Creation of Local Hotspots
1987]
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The current emissions trading policy deals with spatial
impacts by restricting trades which adversely affect air qual-
ity, i.e., those which could cause violation of the NAAQS.
Modelling of the ambient impacts of trades is required for SO 2
depending on the amount of the impact.
If banking of ERCs is allowed, a "temporal hotspot"
could be created if banked ERCs are used up during a short
period of time. Of special concern would be the cumulative,
long-term banking of ERCs. For instance, in figure 2, if all
plants began using their banked ERCs at the same time, am-
bient air concentrations could increase overall even if a spatial
hotspot was not created. Of course, temporal hotspots could
be created locally as in figure 1. Eventually, enough ERCs
could be banked that they greatly exceed the emissions re-
quired to maintain air quality. Under the worst scenario, air
control agencies could not require emission reductions since
sources were only using ERCs to emit; the agency's only alter-
native would be to buy the rights.
The current emissions trading policy prevents temporal
hotspots by prohibiting the use of ERCs if they would inter-
fere with air quality goals.42 States are prohibited from count-
ing banked rights as emission reductions in their SIPs. In ad-
dition, some states confiscate banked rights after ten years
and prohibit banking of rights from plant shutdowns for over
one year.43 Other states discount banked rights if further
emission reductions are required."
Turning to implementation and enforcement, Latin"'
complains that the proponents of emissions trading and other
market solutions to environmental problems have glorified the
theoretical economic advantages of market solutions without
considering the implementation and enforcement problems.46
42. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,834-35.
43. See Kostow & Kowalczyk, A Practical Emissions Trading Program, 33 J. Air
Pollution Control A. 982 (1983).
44. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,834-35.
45. Latin, supra note 40, at 1270.
46. For an example of the simplifying assumptions economists use, see Tschir-
hart, Transferable Discharge Permits and Profit-Maximizing Behavior, Economic
Perspectives on Acid Deposition Control 157, 159-65 (T. Crocker ed. 1984).
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Figure 2
Creation of Temporal Hotspots
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Market approaches rely heavily on precise environmental
data; for example, emissions trading relies more on modelling
and monitoring of emissions than command and control regu-
lations. Market proponents overlook constraints caused by
the complexity of ecosystems which prevent accurate determi-
nation of environmental impacts. As a result, administrators
must adopt a second best approach to environmental regula-
tion based on uniform standards. Monitoring techniques are
complicated and imprecise. Modelling results are often ambig-
uous and easily manipulated. 8 Both monitoring and model-
ling can be extremely expensive. Administrators must care-
fully review models and can only cross-check monitoring by
expensive methods. Thus, emissions trading shifts complexity
and costs from industry to regulators. Also, the increased
complexity allows industry to manipulate requirements to
avoid compliance."'
Proponents of emissions trading have responded that no
program can ever achieve theoretical efficiency. 0 Monitoring
and modelling problems exist with any air quality problem. 1
The current emissions trading policy sets forth the same
quantification methods used for calculating emissions in com-
mand and control regulation.2  Therefore, enforcement of
trades should not be any more difficult than command and
control methods. Though EPA recognizes the difficulties of
modelling the impacts of trades, EPA appears to be prepared
to thoroughly review the models if necessary. 3
The earlier emissions trading policy permitted trading of
47. Gonzalez, Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 377, 388-95 (1981).
48. See generally, Air Pollution Control Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
739 F.2d 1071, 1083 (6th Cir. 1984).
49. Gonzalez, supra note 47, at 384.
50. Tietenberg, supra note 35, at 40.
51. Saideman, An Overview of the Bubble Concept, 8 Col. Envtl. L. Rev. 137, 158
(1982).
52. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,832. Quantification based on emission fac-
tors, stack tests, monitored values, operating rules, averaging times, process or pro-
duction inputs, modelling or other reasonable measurement practices are essentially
the same methods used for calculating command and control requirements.
53. Technical Issues Document, supra note 23, at 43,856.
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allowable emissions rather than requiring real emission reduc-
tions. EPA has responded to those concerns by restricting
trades to actual emission reductions in most circumstances."
However, even proponents of emissions trading admit that
significant amounts of hardware-based innovation have not
occurred.55 Of course, no indication exists that command and
control would do better.
Some environmentalists have expressed concern that al-
lowing people to pay to pollute is morally offensive and may
inhibit future emission control." However, the objective of
emissions trading is the same as command and control regula-
tion even though the means may differ .5 Although EPA pol-
icy has allowed states to establish ERC ownership rights, all
banking must be consistent with attainment of the NAAQS.
States, if they wish to protect ERCs, must produce reductions
elsewhere. 8 One countervailing problem is that giving pol-
luters less than absolute rights to use ERCs undermines the
incentive to produce ERCs.5
Emissions trading provides fewer opportunities for the
public and environmental groups to comment on air pollution
regulation. The 1982 policy failed to require public access to
the emissions trading review process. Environmentalists fear
that government and industry could sell out environmental
values without close scrutiny. The 1986 policy remedies that
problem by providing for more EPA review and for public no-
tification of emissions trading.6 0 However, greater review of
54. Id. at 43,843-52.
55. Palmissano-1985, supra note 34, at 2; Tietenberg, supra note 35, at 198.
56. Meidinger, supra note 28, at 460.
57. See Saideman, supra note 51.
58. Technical Issues Document, supra note 23, at 43,848-50. See also Weiss,
Emissions Trading: Who Pays Just Compensation? (available through AER*X Corp.,
Los Angeles). Meidinger speculates that ERCs could become as vested as landhold-
ings did after William the Conqueror distributed them in 1066. Meidinger, supra note
28, at 470-71.
59. See generally, Palmissano, Have Programs for Trading Emission Reduction
Credits Failed or Succeeded?, presented Aug. 1982 Emissions Trading Conference,
Los Angeles (Available through AER*X Corp., Washington D.C. and Los Ange-
les)[hereinafter Palmissano-1982].
60. Technical Issues Document, supra note 23, at 43,853.
19871
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emissions trading will inevitably increase transaction costs.
Meidinger's greatest concern about market mechanisms is
that they favored moneyed interests over interests of the
poor.6' Groups with money could buy ERCs to protect their
interest; the poor could not. On the other hand, command and
control regulation has not been shown to protect the interest
of the poor any better than emissions trading would. Money
also buys access to command and control decision-making.
Emissions trading requires determination of the public inter-
est in clean air; the interest of the poor can be taken into ac-
count at that time.
3. Market Concerns
The enthusiastic cheerleading of the proponents of emis-
sions trading in the late 1970's and early 1980's has given way
to more somber discourse.2 Complaints about weak markets
and hoarding of ERCs were initially explained as part of a
learning curve or the result of economic stagnation;63 trading
would pick up as firms learned the value of emissions trading
and the economy recovered. However, markets have continued
to be weak despite more knowledge about emissions trading
and a revived economy.
Due to regulatory uncertainty in the administration of
emissions trading, 4 industry has adopted a conservative "wait
and see" approach. EPA has issued new emissions trading
guidelines every three to four years since the 1976 offset pol-
icy including the 1979 AERO policy, the 1982 interim policy
and the 1986 final policy.6 5 This does not even consider the
shifts that have occurred at the state and local levels. The
AERO policy represented a conservative first step upon which
61. Meidinger, supra note 28, at 470.
62. Compare Palmissano-1982, supra note 59, with Palmissano-1985, supra note
34.
63. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 21, 22. For the concern about thin-
markets, see Mendrick, Regulating with a Carrot: Experimenting with Incentives for
Clean Air, 31 Buffalo L. Rev. 193, 207-10 (1982). For a response, see Palmissano-
1982, supra note 59.
64. Levin, supra note 14, at 39.
65. See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
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the 1982 policy expanded. The 1986 policy retreated from the
expansion of the 1982 policy and tried to answer the questions
the 1982 policy left unanswered. EPA's four year failure to
produce a final policy caused a regression in emission trading
at the local level. Some areas considered using growth margins
instead while others waited for EPA's final policy before
adopting their own.6
Meanwhile, court challenges brought emissions trading
transactions to a halt.17 The D.C. Circuit struck down netting
in non-attainment areas.68 A number of states stopped writing
generic rules and approving new bubbles while awaiting the
Supreme Court's decision. 9 Interim application of trading
rules proved difficult.
Even where trading occurred, local trading rules and
modelling requirements unnecessarily inhibited trading; trad-
ing between distant sources was especially affected. Generic
trading rules streamlined the emissions trading approval pro-
cess by eliminating layers of review. However, generic rules
which require excess offsets and permanent trades can inhibit
trading. An offset ratio determines the amount of excess emis-
sion reductions that must be produced before a trade is
allowed.70
Also, uncertainty and regulatory constraints inhibit short
term trades of ERCs and encourage hoarding." Currently, a
short term trade or "lease" would be treated as a trade in
both directions. The offset ratio would discount the emissions
66. Palmissano-1985, supra note 34, at 12-16.
67. Tietenberg, supra note 35, at 201.
68. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 859 (1984); see supra note 14.
69. Tietenberg, supra note 35, at 201.
70. For example, both Los Angeles and San Francisco have rules which calculate
offset ratios for NOx trades based on the distance between sources; a pollutant where
location of the source is not critical at the local level. In Los Angeles the offset ratio is
calculated as: 1.2 for trades less than eight kilometers (five miles) and 1.2 + O.01d for
trades over eight kilometers, where d = distance in kilometers. Id. at 86-88. For a
trade between sources twenty kilometers (12.5 miles) apart, the trading ratio would
be 1.4; the source would need to cut back 1.4 tons of emissions for every ton of ERC
traded.
71. Raufer, Emissions Trading and Acid Deposition Control: The Need for ERC
Leasing, 36 J. Air Pollution Control A. 574 (1986) [hereinafter ERC Leasing].
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on the initial trade and on the return trade resulting in a sub-
stantial discount of emissions.72 In addition, third parties
would never consider purchasing ERCs for investment pur-
poses since they could not obtain rental income while they
await a sale.
Trades involving SO2 are restricted by modelling require-
ments. Trades involving substantial ambient increases require
full-scale modelling of all local sources. Trades involving hilly
terrain require SIP review. Those requirements increase the
transaction costs of the trades and lengthen the review
process.
The individualized nature of each interplant trade in-
creases trading complexity and creates higher transaction
costs, thin markets and uncertain prices. Each company in an
interplant trade operates with a unique set of equipment, con-
ditions and objectives; therefore trades must be tailored to
serve the unique needs of both traders. Imposed upon the
trade are conditions which ensure the trade will not degrade
air quality. The trade will be scrutinized by local and perhaps
federal officials before being finalized. Environmental groups
may oppose certain trades. As a result, each trade is distinct
from other trades. Obtaining an ERC will not be as easy as
calling your broker and ordering stock. Comparing trades to
determine a market price becomes difficult.7 3 Traders will be
cautious since each trade is determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis."' The individualized nature of emissions trades inhibits
development of free-wheeling markets.
Weak markets further discourage transactions. Third-
72. For example, a utility plans to open a new plant in five years. Currently it
operates an old plant emitting 288 tons per day (tpd) of pollutants. If it applied more
advanced controls it could reduce that to 144 tpd. The utility plans to install the
advanced controls to offset the new plant. The reduction could be used for five years
by another company in the interim. If the offset ratio is 1.2, the utility could receive
credit up to 120 tpd on a trade. However, on the return trade it would only be enti-
tled to use 100 tpd. The 144 tpd intraplant credit is discounted to 100 tpd interplant
credit by the sale-and-return transaction, a thirty percent reduction. The utility
would almost certainly decide to hold onto the ERC rather than try a short term
trade.
73. See Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 20.
74. Tietenberg, supra note 35, at 51.
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party investors are reluctant to purchase such speculative in-
vestments. Companies also fear that they will not be able to
obtain ERCs in the future so they hoard the ones that they
have. 5
The uncertain legal status of ERCs makes firms reluctant
to rely on them. Public and private interests conflict; govern-
ment fears that granting entitlements to emissions will inhibit
future control efforts;76 private interests desire certain and
clear rights upon which they can rely and which will not be
confiscated without compensation. 77 So far, EPA policy pro-
hibits trades from interfering with air quality control efforts. 8
States may protect ERCs only by requiring reductions by
other sources. Despite such possible protections, states have
confiscated ERCs in order to obtain reductions needed for at-
tainment.79 Companies may not obtain any rights upon shut-
down. Oregon denies the use of ERCs created by shutdowns if
they are not traded within a year." The tax status of ERCs
has remained uncertain.8 1
The myriad of different local emissions trading ap-
proaches creates greater complexity, increased transaction
costs and possible inefficiency. Each individual state has the
option of adopting generic rules and individual trades.8 ' EPA
policy only provides general guidelines for state generic
rules.8 3 Consequently, many different trading requirements
have been adopted.84 Local banks have greater administrative
75. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 23; Note, Emission Offset-banking: Ac-
commodating Industrial Growth with Air Quality Standards, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 937,
947-64 (1980).
76. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,834-35.
77. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 20.
78. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,843-48.
79. Palmissano-1985, supra note 34, at 12.
80. Kostow & Kowalczyk, supra note 43, at 984. EPA does not prohibit use of
shutdown ERCs so long as the SIP did not count them towards attainment. 1986
policy, supra note 10, at 43,841.
81. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Tax Considerations Related to the Creation,
Financing, Banking Use and Disposition of ERCs in Controlled Trading Approaches
to Air Pollution, pb83-148361 (Jan. 1982).
82. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,831.
83. Id. at 43,836.
84. For a brief comparison of ten rules, see Hahn, Trade-offs in Designing Mar-
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costs than state banks. 5 Traders must inquire at multiple
banks to compare prices; comparison may be impossible if the
banks have different reporting requirements.8 6 All of these
complexities lead to higher transaction costs.
III. Interstate Trading
A. Current Rules
The 1986 emissions trading policy allows interstate trad-
ing in limited circumstances. The trades must be between
sources in neighboring states. The trade must meet the sub-
stantive requirements of the more stringent state. Each trade
must be implemented through case-by-case SIP revisions and
must meet all other trading requirements. Impliedly, each
state can reject the trade.
B. Interstate Trading Under Senate Bill 316
Senate Bill 316 proposes a two-step emission reduction
process resulting in a fifty percent SO 2 emissions decrease. In
1992, major fossil-fuel fired boilers would be limited to 2
pounds of SO2 emissions per million BTUs of heat on a state-
wide basis (2 lbs./M-BTU; BTU = British thermal unit, a
measure of the heating capability of a fuel) and 1.2 lbs./M-
BTU in 1997. Also, statewide emissions will be limited based
on the amount of BTUs produced in 1980. The EPA may rec-
ommend changes in the second phase to Congress. The pro-
gram will be implemented through the SIP process. If states
fail to produce plans, the individual sources will be responsi-
ble for meeting the specified limits. Continuous emissions
monitoring is mandated to assure compliance with emission
limits. States may re-allot emission reductions between them-
selves. States or source operators may choose to meet the re-
kets with Multiple Objectives, 13 J. Envtl. Econ. Mgmt. 1, 8-9 (1986).
85. See Mendrick, supra note 63, at 223.
86. Many banks do not require cost information to be included. Tietenberg,
supra note 35, at 40. Even EPA is uncertain of the extent of current emissions trad-
ing activities since it does not learn of many trades until state approval. Levin, supra
note 14, at 34.
87. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,814.
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quirements of the bill by alternative programs including intra-
state and interstate emissions trading."
Trades cannot increase emissions and must involve actual
emission reductions brought about by fuel substitution, en-
forceable continuous emission reduction techniques, coal-
washing or shutdowns. Trades are enforceable by the federal
government, by states in which the ERCs are produced, and
by citizen suits. Both the states and EPA may establish banks
to facilitate trading.
1. The Promise
Local emissions trading has prevented the direct sacrifice
of environmental values for economic goals. In contrast, inter-
state emissions trading is being used affirmatively to further
environmental goals by mitigating the economic impact of
acid deposition controls.8 9 Uniform requirements for scrubber
installation to reduce acid deposition would burden Midwest-
ern utilities with the highest SO2 emissions. Such proposals
have created a political and economic outcry from utilities.90
Interstate trading is politically advantageous because it does
not burden utilities with specific technology requirements
leaving them no choice but to raise rates. Therefore, interstate
trading offers political advantages antithetical to those which
led to the development of local trading.
Interstate trading can be more cost-effective than tech-
nology forcing requirements and intrastate trading. Numerous
studies have been developed showing the cost advantages of
intrastate trading over technology-based standards. 1 A study
for Congress estimated that the cost of reducing SO 2 emis-
sions would be substantially increased if utilities are required
88. S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 188 (1987).
89. Hartman, Alternatives for Regulatory Control of Acid Rain in the North-
eastern United States, 11 Fordham Urb. L. J. 455, 481-82 (1983).
90. Id. at 480 n.153.
91. OTA Report, supra note 6; Argonne National Laboratories, Controlling
Acidic Deposition: Targeted Strategies for Reducing Sulfur Dioxide Emissions,
ANL/EES-TM-282 (1984) [hereinafter Argonne Report]; Streets, A Regional, New
Source Bubble Policy: Its Advantages Illustrated for the State of Illinois, 34 J. Air
Pollution Control A. 25 (1984).
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to install control technology wet scrubbers.2 Interstate trad-
ing creates a bigger market for ERCs than intrastate trading
because more trading combinations can create a greater po-
tential for cost savings. Argonne National Laboratories esti-
mates that interstate emission tradings can save fifty percent
when compared to intrastate trading; in addition, acid deposi-
tion in the Northeast would be reduced between 10 and 30
percent. 3
Interstate trading rewards the use of innovative control
technologies in the same manner as local trading.9 4 Also, ad-
ministrators will not need to develop specific control stan-
dards as in the past.
2. Environmental Concerns
Trading of acid deposition control rights could create hot-
spots at locations where acid deposition increases. For in-
stance, in figure 3,95 a trade from plant A with a short emis-
sion stack to plant B with a tall emission stack would increase
the amount of acid deposition at the mountain. Also, a trade
from plant A far away from the mountains to Plant C located
closer could result in increased acid deposition at the
mountain.
Implementation and enforcement of interstate emissions
trading may become more complex than that of intrastate
trading. Trades may involve states with different methods of
quantifying ERCs creating a bias favoring trading with states
with liberal ERC creation policies over states with more re-
strictive ones. Current EPA policy attempts to alleviate this
problem by applying the most stringent rule. Senate Bill 316
proposes continuous emissions monitoring to alleviate quanti-
fication concerns. Paper trades may be less of a problem
under interstate trading since the new EPA policy and Senate
Bill 316 require actual emission reductions to be traded.
92. OTA report, supra note 6, at 169.
93. Argonne Report, supra note 91, at 46.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
95. See figure 3 following.
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Figure 3
Increased Acid Deposition Impacts
Caused by Emission Trading
C
A B
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Interstate emissions trading relies more heavily on model-
ling than local emissions trading. The models used in inter-
state emissions trading will be even more speculative and
open to manipulation than those used in local emissions trad-
ing.96 Individual sources or states could manipulate the mod-
els to show decreased environmental effects.
Interstate trading may have enforcement gaps. Coordina-
tion between states would be required to insure ERCs traded
to one state are not used by the creator in another state. Un-
fortunately, interstate coordination has proven very ineffec-
tive in the past in dealing with air pollution problems. States
which lack areas sensitive to acid deposition have less incen-
tive to enforce ERCs traded to other states; enforcement of
ERC trades will not benefit the state but could increase utility
costs and political problems for the enforcing agency.
Interstate trading may be hampered by the uncertainty in
the amount of acid deposition emission reductions required.
The emissions reductions specified by Senate Bill 316 were
calculated by rolling back emissions, not by estimating the
amount of reductions required to prevent harm from acid
deposition.97 Therefore, those reductions do not ensure an ad-
equate solution to the acid deposition problem. Future scien-
tific studies may reveal that further reductions are required.
In fact, Senate Bill 316 proposes a two-step reduction process
with the second step occurring if scientific evidence indicates
that such a step is necessary. 8 Therefore, granting vested
rights to emit acid deposition would be premature because
more reductions may be required in the future. However,
without vested rights, acid deposition ERCs would be specula-
tive and difficult to trade.
The complexity of environmental problems such as acid
deposition may prevent the government from ever granting
absolutely vested rights. The government could never assure
itself that the correct level of emissions reduction has been
achieved. An unavoidable tradeoff exists between the in-
96. Argonne Report, supra note 91, at 8.
97. S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 183 (1987).
98. Id. §§ 184, 185.
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creased marketability of assured rights and the necessity of
limiting rights to insure they do not conflict with environmen-
tal quality.9 However, trading rights could be protected by
requiring reductions elsewhere or proportionately reducing all
rights."'0
Interstate trading could decrease public access to the de-
cision-making process if no local hearings are held. The final
decision-makers may be in another region or in Washington,
D.C., far removed from the control of local citizens.
Interstate trading could impact the poor more readily
than local trading. Just as interstate trading creates a bigger
market with greater potential for cost-savings, interstate trad-
ing increases the opportunity to shift the burdens of pollution
to the poor. The poor have less money to spend on access to
decision-making and no money to purchase ERCs.
3. Market Concerns
Interstate trading could greatly magnify regulatory uncer-
tainty because of the greater number of jurisdictions involved.
On the one hand, Congressional adoption of interstate trading
of acid deposition emissions would avoid the legal uncertainty
which initially hampered local trading.0 1 On the other hand,
Senate Bill 316 lacks a clear conception of how interstate
trading should be administered; both the EPA and states are
authorized to establish banks and brokerages to facilitate
trading. Conflicting state and federal programs could inhibit
both local and interstate trading. Comparability of ERCs
could be difficult. Rules for creating ERCs may use different
baselines, calculation methods or monitoring techniques.
ERCs could be stored in both local and federal banks creating
further confusion and undermining their value. Different re-
porting requirements would make price comparison more
difficult.
Current EPA policy calls for using the state with the
strictest standards when evaluating interstate trades and SIP
99. Hahn, supra note 84.
100. 1986 Policy, supra note 10, at 43,834-35.
101. See supra note 14.
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review for all interstate trades. ERCs from one state may need
to be re-evaluated under another state's rules thereby increas-
ing transaction costs. A SIP review for each trade would be
time consuming and increase transaction costs. The experi-
ence with SIP review before the adoption of generic rules is a
perfect example of the problems with that process; reviews
took an average of 18 months." 2
Cooperation and coordination between local air pollution
agencies would be necessary. Unfortunately, cooperation in
controlling interstate air pollution has been almost non-exis-
tent.1 3 Bills such as Senate bill 316 have been proposed to
remedy the interstate air pollution problems which have not
been solved by cooperation. Surveyed utilities cited animosity
and the prior lack of cooperation between states as a potential
impediment to interstate emissions trading.104 Under Senate
bill 316, state governors can choose whether or not to enter
into agreements to reallot or trade ERCs.10 5 Therefore, this
may allow uncooperative states to refuse any trades or selec-
tively favor sales or purchases of ERCs.
Lack of direction from EPA could also inhibit interstate
trading. Many states may wait for an EPA policy. EPA's delay
in issuing a final emissions trading policy inhibited trading.0 6
Lack of strong federal leadership has also contributed to the
failure of interstate air pollution. EPA has refused to recog-
nize the complaints of states affected by acid deposition under
the interstate provisions of the Act and has failed to use its
discretionary authority. If cooperation or federal leadership
are lacking, litigation may be required to clarify the roles of
the states and the EPA. Trading would be blocked until the
litigation is resolved. Without a clear administrative ap-
proach, interstate trading could become as ineffective as the
interstate air pollution provisions of the Act.
Interstate trading could be halted if overly restrictive
102. Levin, supra note 14, at 38.
103. Winslow, supra note 5, at 9.
104. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 24.
105. S. 316, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. § 186 (1987).
106. Palmissano-1985, supra note 34, at 12-16.
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trading rules or modelling requirements are adopted. Many
current trading rules greatly discourage long-distance trad-
ing.107 As a result, trades which shift acid deposition impacts
away from sensitive areas could essentially be blocked. Local
modelling requirements may unnecessarily inhibit trading.
Trading under an acid deposition program mainly involves se-
curing the right to continue polluting at the current level.
Emission increases should not occur, making local modelling
requirements unnecessary. If local modelling is required, it
would increase transaction costs and inhibit trading.
Probably the biggest difficulty in allowing interstate trad-
ing is determining whether to use trading ratios or modelling
to determine the amount of offsets required. Trading ratios
lower modelling requirements and transaction costs. 1 8 How-
ever, trading ratios based on the distance between sources
could eliminate beneficial trades, if not all trades. The effect
of stack heights should be considered as well as prevailing
wind patterns. Trading ratios could become so complicated
they effectively become crude dispersion models.
The requirement for permanent trades once again inhib-
its trading especially when coupled with trading ratios. Utili-
ties are one of the major sources of acid deposition. They de-
sire to save ERCs for future customers.10 9 A phased reduction
program such as that provided in Senate Bill 316 creates the
potential for increased savings through leasing. For example,
Utility A cannot achieve the first reduction step without in-
stalling controls capable of controlling to the second step
(scrubbers for instance). Utility B could meet the first step by
installing some temporary equipment (a coal washer for in-
stance). If Utility B could lease Utility A's surplus reduction
for the time being it could avoid installing the coal washer.
Without leasing, Utility A may be reluctant to sell and may
operate the new equipment without a large over-control mar-
gin. A sell and buy-back arrangement could greatly decrease
107. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 19; Tietenberg, supra note 35, at 86-
88.
108. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 19-20.
109. ERC Leasing, supra note 71, at 574.
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the size of the ERC. With leasing, Utility A can lease the ERC
for a profit. However, the short duration of leases could raise
transaction costs and make enforcement more problematic.
Interstate trades will inevitably involve higher transac-
tion costs than local trading. Negotiation costs will increase
due to the increased transportation and communication costs.
Locating trading partners could be more difficult especially if
no centralized brokerage exists. Modelling, if required, will be
more expensive. More public hearings could be involved. Re-
view might be required by three or more agencies.
The legal and tax status of ERCs could vary from state to
state magnifying their uncertain status.' Sources may be re-
luctant to rely on other states to protect their interests. Could
one state confiscate an ERC produced within its state? Could
a state require a purchaser of an out-of-state ERC to reduce
emissions anyway if the state failed to adequately reduce
emissions? Sources may be doubly wary about trading if those
questions remain unanswered. Uncertainty in the amount of-
future reductions required increases fear of confiscation."'
Hoarding occurs because those who give up ERCs have no
assurance that they can obtain an ERC for a fair price later.
Public utilities use condemnation proceedings to obtain
rights-of-way for expansion of generation and transmission fa-
cilities. No such mechanism exists to acquire ERCs. As a sub-
stitute for condemnation, the current Act allows localities to
create growth margins to assure that new facilities can obtain
offsets. Senate Bill 316 grants no authority to assure that
ERCs will be available in the future.
C. Special Interstate Issues
The status of new sources under Senate Bill 316 is un-
clear. In one section the bill states that new sources are ex-
empt from its requirements."' In another section, the bill cre-
ates statewide bubbles on total emissions.1 3 Whether the new
110. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 20.
111. Id.
112. S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 181 (1987).
113. Id. § 183.
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sources would need to offset the amount of new emissions
they create is unclear. If they do not need to offset, the bill
may unintentionally favor new sources. A utility could simply
build a new generator rather than having to offset emissions.
A utility could trade ERCs from one old facility to another. A
new plant could be opened causing a net increase in emis-
sions. Companies may argue that modifications create "new"
sources and therefore they can sell the ERCs to somebody
else, reversing arguments used to avoid New Source Perform-
ance Standards (NSPS) review of modifications.
Different treatment of trading by state public utility com-
missions (PUCs) could complicate interstate trading. An acid
deposition control program will especially impact public utili-
ties since they account for a large share of the SO 2 and NO.
emissions. The cost of acid deposition control will be distrib-
uted to the customers through the rate-making process. Dif-
ferent cost accounting methods could affect the value to utili-
ties of creating and using ERCs. 1"4 Under original cost
accounting, a utility's rate of return is calculated based on the
purchase price of property and equipment. The bill gives
ERCs to existing sources for free; therefore, a utility may not
be entitled to any return on the sale of ERCs created by plant
shutdowns. Also, customers may insist that profits from inter-
state emissions trading pass through to them as lower rates. ' 5
Pass through already occurs in some states for profits created
by interstate power sales.
PUCs may serve as another conduit for political action to
block interstate emissions trading. Ratepayers may object to
paying for emission reductions in other states without receiv-
ing the environmental benefits." ' However, the ratepayers do
receive an economic benefit of reduced rates.
The corporate culture of public utilities may inhibit inter-
state trading. Utilities tend to have conservative business phi-
losophies which emphasize system reliability and providing
114. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 21.
115. Trisko & Wayland, Acid Rain Control and Public Utility Regulation, Pub.
Util. Fort., Aug. 30, 1984, at 20-21.
116. Id. at 20-21; Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 25.
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for future growth over cost-minimization. "' Therefore, utili-
ties may not become strongly involved in interstate trading.
One study indicated that utilities preferred to hold ERCs
rather than trade them.11 8 ERC leasing could offer a trading
environment more conducive to utilities.
IV. Recommendations
A. Environmental Review Standards
Acidic emissions trading should be allowed to the extent
it does not increase acid deposition in certain sensitive areas.
The main concern of acid deposition legislation is the impact
of acid deposition in certain sensitive areas." 9 Trades which
would increase deposition in those areas should be prohibited.
Either modelling or trading ratios could assure that acid dep-
osition does not increase in sensitive areas. Otherwise, no net
increase in acidic emissions should be allowed. Senate Bill 316
already sets a cap on overall emissions from plants existing in
1980. However, the cap excludes new sources. A loophole may
exist which favors new sources over modification of old
sources. Senate Bill 316 should be modified to include a cap
on emissions from all sources. Acidic emissions trading must
also meet the requirements of the NAAQS. Emission ceilings
for each source could assure NAAQS attainment and decrease
local modelling requirements for interstate trades. Emission
ceilings could be set close to current emission levels or the
baseline levels used to calculate 1980 emissions under Senate
Bill 316. Trading under an acid deposition program will
mainly involve securing the right to continue polluting since
Senate Bill 316 proposes emission reductions in excess of
those needed to obtain the NAAQS. Therefore, emission in-
creases should not occur and emission ceilings would assure
the attainment of the NAAQS. Limiting local modelling to sit-
uations involving emission increases above the emission ceil-
117. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 22; ERC Leasing, supra note 71, at
574.
118. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 22-23.
119. See supra notes 4, 5.
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ings will reduce transaction costs, streamline review and pre-
vent temporal hotspots.
B. Administration
EPA should promulgate uniform rules for quantification
and monitoring. Uniform rules for creation and monitoring of
acid deposition ERCs would alleviate bias created by non-uni-
form rules, increase regulatory certainty and decrease transac-
tion costs. Purchasers could not look for states with lax rules
on ERC creation to purchase cheap ERCs. Honest purchasers
would be more certain of what they are buying and could
more readily compare ERCs. Sellers and buyers would not
have to try and figure out which state rule is the toughest.
The EPA would not need to review ERCs under two sets of
rules. Trading would not have to wait until courts decide who
has authority to permit trading. Each state would not need to
spend money developing their own rules. 2 '
EPA could develop a uniform dispersion model (or mod-
els) to determine the impacts of trades. Perhaps the model
could be privatized. Trades which decreased the impact of
acid deposition on sensitive areas would be allowed on a one-
to-one basis. Other trades could only occur to the extent they
do not increase acid deposition in sensitive areas. Using one
model would decrease transaction costs and thwart efforts to
manipulate modelling results. EPA staff would not need to
constantly review individual models thereby reducing delay.
Updates could readily be performed as researchers develop
more scientific data. Although modelling for individual
120. EPA could possibly assure the protection of sensitive areas by not adopting
any special acid deposition trading policy. The no policy option discourages environ-
mentally unfavorable long-distance trades. Interstate acid deposition trades would be
reviewed by the EPA under the SIP process on a case-by-case basis. EPA would ap-
ply the rules of the strictest state. The more intricate SIP review process would in-
crease the transaction costs for interstate trades as compared to intrastate trades.
Sources would first seek intrastate trades to save time and money. As a result, less
interstate trading would occur. Also, trades between non-neighboring states are pro-
hibited under EPA's current policy. However, the no policy option could also discour-
age interstate trades which decrease deposition on sensitive areas and could snuff out
interstate trading altogether.
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sources may be very inaccurate, trading ratios are also very
crude and can unnecessarily restrict trading. Trading ratios
must rely on modelling data in any case to determine multi-
plication factors. Trading ratios may be more favorable than
modelling due to their simplicity and lower costs. Trading ra-
tios based on the distance between sources will unnecessarily
discourage trades from sources located near sensitive areas to
sources removed from sensitive areas. Therefore, trading ra-
tios should be based on the distance the source is from the
nearest sensitive area. The OTA and Argonne National Lab
reports can be used to identify sensitive areas. 2 ' Also, trading
ratios should consider stack height since taller stacks will in-
crease the amount of acid deposition received by sensitive ar-
eas. A factor taking into account prevailing wind patterns at
each of the sources should be included. The formula would
look like:
Deposition Factor = Distance to Nearest Sensitive Area
+ Stack Height + Wind Factor
The deposition factor could be calculated for each source
prior to trading and would not vary from trade to trade. The
trading ratio for a trade would be:
Trading Ratio = User's Deposition Factor -
Seller's Deposition Factor
If the trading ratio was less than one (i.e. the trade de-
creases deposition at the sensitive area), trading could occur
on a one-to-one basis. Referring back to figure 3,122 a trade
from plant C to plant A or B would meet this criteria. If the
trading ratio exceeded one (i.e. the trade increases deposition
at the sensitive area), the trading ratio would be used to cal-
culate the excess emissions reductions required. In figure 3
trades from plant A to plants B or C would be reduced using
the trading ratio. One potential problem exists with this
method. Basing the trading ratio on the distance to the near-
est sensitive area might overburden sensitive areas located
121. OTA Report, supra note 6; Argonne Report, supra note 91.
122. See figure 3 supra p. 319.
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near cheap high sulfur coal. Sources in those areas could
purchase ERCs from sources which could switch to low-sulfur
coal and which are located approximately the same distance
from a different sensitive area. That problem could be re-
solved by creating smaller trading regions. Of course, that
could create a smaller, thinner market for ERCs.
Leasing of ERCs would be allowed for periods over three
years. Shorter leases would create time burdens for regulators
and produce enforcement difficulties. Leases would undergo
the same review process as trades. However, discounts of the
ERC from modelling or trading rules would apply only to the
lessee. The lessor would be entitled to use the entire ERC
provided no further emission reductions have been required.
Public hearings and local review would ensure that envi-
ronmental values protected by an acid deposition reduction
program are not sacrificed for economic gain. EPA uniform
rules for quantification and trading would streamline review
and assure trades are reviewed under the same standards.
Hearings could be held near the buying and selling source by
the local agencies. Either local agency could veto the sale.
However, the buyer or seller could appeal to the EPA. If the
trade met the criteria set forth in the EPA rules, the local
agency would have the burden of proving the trade should not
occur. The EPA would review the local records and decide.
This type of review process would maximize public impact
while decreasing transaction costs as compared to SIP review;
fewer arbitrary decisions will occur at the local level.
The 1986 EPA policy allows states to choose whether or
not to adopt emission trading programs. My proposal admit-
tedly takes away the states' choice to decline acid deposition
trading. Fairness and equity dictate that states should be al-
lowed to achieve the savings from interstate trading envi-
sioned in any political compromise concerning acid deposition;
only a federal program could assure those savings are achieved
without arbitrary local decisions. Allowing individual states
veto power over interstate trades is less justifiable in the acid
deposition context than in the NAAQS context. NAAQS are
designed to improve and protect local ambient air quality.
Each locality has an interest in preserving its own air quality.
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Any acid deposition reductions will be designed to reduce acid
deposition in areas far removed from the location of the emis-
sions; therefore, the local agencies may not have as strong an
interest in allowing trading. Acid deposition is much more of
an interstate problem than achievement of the NAAQS. In ar-
eas where interstate pollution is a problem under NAAQS,
states have failed to cooperate and the EPA has failed to re-
quire any emission reductions.123
Sources would be required to modify their local operating
permits to ensure both local and federal enforceability. Moni-
toring would be carried out along with standard enforcement
measures. EPA would audit local ERC banks and enforcement
programs. Handling enforcement through existing programs
will increase administrative efficiency and regulatory cer-
tainty.
C. Banking
A central federal bank and brokerage would track the cre-
ation of all ERCs and the completion of all trades. Uniform
reporting criteria would include the price paid for the ERC,
the size of the emission reduction, the cost of creating the
ERC and the savings from the purchase. Local agencies or
states could operate local branches which could facilitate in-
trastate or interstate trades.
Banked ERCs would be protected for a period of five
years, assuring sources their investments are protected but al-
lowing for future reductions if necessary. After five years,
ERCs could be discounted if future reductions are necessary.
After twenty years, the ERC would be forfeited to the state of
origin. These time periods will allow utilities to plan for fu-
ture plants, 24 reduce the possibility of temporal hotspots, dis-
courage hoarding and assure that administrators can reduce
emissions in the future if necessary. A five year absolute pro-
tection allows time to review the success of current reductions.
The following fifteen years give utilities some certainty in
123. Winslow, supra note 5, at 9.
124. Raufer & Feldman, supra note 15, at 21.
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planning for future plants. The confiscation assures that large
numbers of ERCs do not accumulate over time.
D. Special Concerns
EPA could delegate part of its authority to establish a
brokerage for ERCs to the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC). Since FERC already regulates interstate
electricity transmission rates,'2 5 it has the expertise to review
utility price structures. Hearings could be held and question-
naires sent to PUCs and utilities to determine the best ac-
counting method for handling the emission trading transac-
tions of public utilities. FERC could then issue guidelines to
the state PUCs on accounting methods for interstate emission
trades involving public utilities. Using FERC's expertise to set
accounting guidelines would decrease regulatory uncertainty
and avoid non-uniform treatment of ERCs by PUCs which
would inhibit trading.
V. Conclusion
An emissions trading program must preserve the funda-
mental environmental value of the overall environmental pro-
gram. In the case of acid deposition, emissions trading must
not increase the amount of acid deposition in sensitive areas.
Also, acid emissions trading must also assure attainment of
the NAAQS. Implementation must assure that ERCs are uni-
formly created, that sources do not excessively manipulate
modelling and monitoring techniques and that agencies can
enforce ERCs as effectively as uniform controls. The public
must have access to the decision-making process to ensure-
that trading preserves environmental goals, considers local
concerns and does not burden poor people. Trading and bank-
ing cannot create vested rights which could inhibit future
reductions.
Trading should be allowed since it increases the chance of
passing an acid deposition control bill, decreases the cost of
acid deposition reductions and allows greater flexibility to
125. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824k (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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sources. An interstate emission trading policy should clarify
the conflicting authority of state and federal programs. Trad-
ing rules intended to preserve environmental values should
not be unnecessarily restrictive of long-distance or short-term
trades. The administrative review process should be clarified
and streamlined to decrease delay and transaction costs. Legal
rights in ERCs should be clarified as much as possible. If fu-
ture adjustments are necessary, discounting of ERCs should
be preferred to confiscation.
A clear and uniform interstate emissions trading policy
will decrease both regulatory uncertainty and transaction
costs and provide uniform standards for review of trades. A
well designed interstate emissions policy can enhance the po-
litical desirability of acid deposition reductions without sacri-
ficing environmental values.
Stephen P. Winslow
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